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ISSN 1109-6691 Editorial 
  The South-Eastern European Monetary History Network (SEEMHN) is a 
community of financial historians, economists and statisticians, established in April 
2006 at the initiation of the Bulgarian National Bank and the Bank of Greece. Its 
objective is to spread knowledge on the economic history of the region in the context 
of European experience with a specific focus on financial, monetary and banking 
history. The First and the Second Annual Conferences were held in Sofia (BNB) in 
2006 and in Vienna (OeNB) in 2007. Additionally, the SEEMHN Data Collection 
Task Force aims at establishing a historical data base with 19
th and 20
th century 
financial and monetary data for countries in the region. A set of data has already been 
published as an annex to the 2007 conference proceedings, released by the OeNB 
(2008, Workshops, no 13). 
On 13-14 March 2008, the Third Annual Conference was held in Athens, 
hosted by the Bank of Greece. The conference was dedicated to Banking and Finance 
in South-Eastern Europe: Lessons of Historical Experience. It was attended by 
representatives of the Albanian, Austrian, Belgian, Bulgarian, German, Greek, 
Romanian, Russian, Serbian and Turkish central banks, as well as participants from a 
number of universities and research institutions. Professor Michael Bordo delivered 
the key note speech on Growing up to Financial Stability. The participants presented, 
reviewed and assessed the experience of SE Europe with financial development, 
banking and central banking from a comparative and historical perspective. 
The 4
th Annual SEEMHN Conference will be hosted by the National Serbian 
Bank on 27
th March 2009 in Belgrade. The topic of the Conference will be Economic 
and Financial Stability in SE Europe in a Historical and Comparative Perspective. 
  The papers presented at the 2008 SEEMHN Conference are being made 
available to a wider audience in the Working Paper Series of the Bank of Greece. 
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1.  Introduction 
In the course of the 1980s, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia faced severe economic 
crises generated in different political contexts but sharing common features and 
outcomes. For both countries, those disorders were not simply events related to 
habitual macroeconomic imbalances. They bore the seals of a fin de reigne and of the 
ultimate exhaustion of long-standing societal and economic models. Indeed, Bulgaria 
and Yugoslavia represented archetypes of the post-war communist extremes. The 
former was the most orthodox Soviet ally, copying in details the features of its 
planning infrastructure. The latter, in turn, symbolized for decades the “revisionist” 
approach to economic policy and successfully played in the no man’s land between 
the Communist block and Western democracies. Thus a comparative view of the 
stabilization policies designed and discussed in those countries during the fatal 
economic crises of their regimes offers promising insights. 
The timing of the events is not strictly overlapping. Whereas in Bulgaria the 
1990 default on foreign debt was the climax of a debacle that provoked the fall of an 
ailing political rule, in Yugoslavia the 1983 suspension of payments was the starting 
point in the irreversible decline and eventual (by early 1990s as well) breakdown of 
the system. The broad frame is also apparently dissimilar, the main distinction being 
the presence of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Yugoslavia. But those 
differences only underscore that the two cases are basically about the same story: the 
reluctance to abandon an entrenched economic status quo and the disastrous 
consequences this entails. Indeed the role of the IMF is better highlighted by allowing 
a comparison between “with-without” scenarios in a communist context. 
Part 2 of the paper outlines the character of the crises and enters into details 
concerning the stabilization policy discussed and adopted by the two Governments. In 
Yugoslavia, the main points have been debated more or less overtly due to the 
presence of foreign experts and the conditionality imposed by the IMF. By contrast, 
Bulgarian policy-making was extremely secretive. Newly accessible archival evidence 
permits us to explore for the first time the views of the authorities “from the inside”. 
In Part 3, the establishment’s vision is compared to that of critical scholars and 
professionals. The opposition of the standpoints is an exercise in history of ideas and 
permits a retrospective assessment of the conceptual readiness of the society for the   8
forthcoming transition to a market economy in the early 1990s. Some comparative 
conclusions are drawn in Part 4. 
 
2. The Ruling Elites’ Vision   
2.1 Bulgaria: the invisible barriers 
From 1985 the Bulgarian economy was trapped in a vicious circle of pseudo-
reforms that exacerbated – instead of alleviated – the imbalances in the untouched 
fundamentals of the centrally planned system in place (Kornai, 1992; Ivanov, 2008). 
Expanding imports from the West were accompanied by growing exports and credits 
to insolvent Third World countries, thus building a debt burden in convertible 
currencies that rapidly attained unsustainable levels. Subsidies to domestic producers 
were soaring due to widespread inefficiency and soft budget constraints. Credit to 
enterprises was de facto “automatic” (at least for the objectives fixed by the plan), 
orchestrated and tightly controlled by the monobank. Deepening budget deficits were 
financed through growing monetization of central bank’s resources, large-scale 
decapitalization of enterprises and extorted “forced savings” of households. The 
newly created commercial banks (1987) were no more than simulacrum – they rapidly 
became an additional source of quasi-fiscal resources and generated unmanageable 
flows of bad credits, which had to be covered by money creation. When the political 
regime collapsed (November 1989), the country was on the verge of defaulting on its 
foreign debt (default was actually declared in March 1990). The economy had 
accumulated a huge inflationary potential that, however, was kept implicit due to the 
still maintained fixed prices: the reverse side of the phenomenon was hoarding of 
commodities with the resulting deficits and the flourishing “grey” markets. The basic 
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Table 1: Bulgaria 1985-1991 – Basic Indicators   
(Annual percentage change) 
 
                1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991 
 
GDP          2.7  4.2    6.0   2.6  -1.9  -12.0  -16.7 
Exports in convertible currency                 -21.8  15.8  -1.9  -8.6    -5.4   -8.8 
Current account for transactions 
in convertible currencies 
(mn USD)                                    -85      -715      -773    -840  -1306   -860  -906 
Money supply                  12.9   13.1   5.2    31.0  244.1
  
CPI                               50.6*  490 
 
Source: BNB Annual reports, 1990, 1991 
  *1990 CPI: May-December 
          
 
The scale and character of the crisis were unprecedented for the Bulgarian 
communist regime. The purely functional dimensions of the events could be reduced 
to a well-known combination of external payments’ difficulties, foreign refinancing 
shortages and soaring fiscal deficits, i.e. to a mix requiring strong deflationary 
policies. What made the situation unique was the completely changed context, which 
did not compare to any previous experience with balance of payment and debt 
imbalances. Bulgaria had already faced two debt crises (in early 60s and late 70s.), 
settled through arrangements with the USSR
1, but in the second half of the 80s, an 
intra-COMECON deal was no longer plausible. The convertible currency debt 
exposure was to Western banks, the possibilities and willingness of the Soviet Union 
to perform once more the role of a “payer of last resort” had vanished and the Polish 
(1981) and Yugoslav (1983) defaults had, inter alia, undermined the credibility of the 
Eastern block. Besides, society was in many respects relatively more open, permeable 
and informed than in the past – consumerist models accompanied growing economic 
exchange with developed countries; the Soviet “perestroika” had given impetus to 
                                                 
1 The first crisis was the result of high indebtedness to London and Paris-based Soviet banks. In fact, 
these were indirect liabilities towards the USSR. After it became clear that Bulgaria was not in a 
position to repay the debts out of its foreign exchange reserves, the Party’s leader approved in 1962 and 
1964 the selling of the gold reserves. (Part of them was pledged as collateral to loans obtained from the 
Soviet banks). The second crisis was settled after the USSR permitted Bulgaria to re-export Soviet oil 
and oil products to the Western markets at world prices.   10
certain (still heavily controlled) intellectual debates; social and interests’ structure had 
became more complex. 
All these changes implied that a way out of the crisis could not rely on 
replicating previous patterns. A globally tinted arrangement was inevitable against the 
background of a global debt crisis. Welfare had become a highly politically sensitive 
issue and consumption-cutting macroeconomic adjustment was not as easy as in 
previous years. The richer social texture produced diverging motivations for reforms. 
Although everyone verbally acknowledged the need for “radical” changes, the visions 
differed substantially: the marasmatic party elite developed and launched sets of 
palliative measures; “reformers” promoted intrinsically inconsistent steps that 
multiplied the leakages in a yet poorly controlled economy; technocrats were 
burdened with day-to-day management and were split between opposing lobbyist 
groups; isolated and increasingly loud intellectuals dug into the roots of 
macroeconomic distortions. Thus, growing awareness of the situation’s novelty 
motivated an uneven search for new stabilization policies and instruments. 
The official positions are well documented in the public rhetoric and in the 
“visible” decisions taken by the Government. What remained opaque until recently is 
the extent of the authorities’ knowledge, the thoroughness and timing of their 
assessments and the policy scenarios considered. It is only with the opening of 
important segments of the communist archives that it became possible to produce a 
more insightful view on the ongoing debates inside governing circles. The new 
archival evidence for the period and for the bulk of ex-communist countries (labelled 
by some historiographers a true “archival revolution” - Gregory and Harrison, 2005) 
permits a re-thinking of many clichés, a re-formulation of  old questions, the display 
of previously unobservable nuances among the personalities of the regime. It allows 
for subtler periodisations, reveals hiterto hidden institutional conflicts and tests 
hypotheses not only on indirect indications but also on historical facts. 
In Bulgaria, the opening of the files has proceeded at very different rates. The 
archives of the Communist Party and of the Council of Ministers were made public a 
decade ago. Those of key institutions like the Ministry of finance, the Planning 
commission or the Foreign Trade Bank are still only partly accessible. Of course, the 
question remains (and probably will remain unanswered) whether the totality of the 
documents have been transferred to the National Archives.   11
Without doubt, the most relevant testimonies concerning stabilization policy 
are to be found in the files of the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB), which used to be 
an unapproachable territory. They were opened to the public in 1999 with an 
extremely generous clearance period of merely ten years, thus illuminating the time 
span of the crisis. As scholarly scrutiny of such a vast depository requires time, the 
first systematic accounts started to appear only recently. Our findings are based on 
evidence collected from the bank’s archives. 
Thanks to its functional place, the BNB was at the very centre of the crisis 
management. It was directly exposed to the most pressing economic issues and 
handled key databases. The monobank had a pivotal position in the planning and 
actual movement of financial flows. While fulfilling its foreign payment and loan 
rising assignments the BNB operated in the contact zone with capitalist markets 
where no soft budget constraints existed, and the routine accounting manipulations of 
domestic agents were excluded. Beside, the management of foreign exchange reserves 
granted access to one of the regime’s economic sanctuaries: since Stalin, foreign 
reserves had always been an exclusive personal domain of the communist dictators 
(Gregory and Harrison, 2005, p.744). All those peculiarities granted the BNB (like 
every monobank) considerable discretionary power, which Party hierarchy monitored 
closely. The Governor had typically no political weight and the institution was 
considered a technocratic body. In turn, the bank was permitted to adopt a more 
pragmatic language, to avoid (to a certain degree) the ideological litany, to focus on 
practical problems and/or solutions. 
The documents reveal how the BNB informed the Communist party leadership 
about the build-up of foreign debt. It has to be noted that external debt (in rubbles and 
in convertible currencies) was an issue of the utmost secrecy. Data circulated among 
an extremely narrow circle of high-level Party and Government officials, while 
academia (not to say the general public) were completely isolated from any 
discussion. 
Following a series of balance of payments surpluses, a deficit was posted for 
the first time in 1985. Initially, it was related to an exceptional bad harvest, but very 
soon, the bank started sending increasingly alarming signals. The prospect of   12
insolvency was uttered almost immediately. In the Annual report for 1986
2, the BNB 
boldly warned that continuing deficits would unavoidably lead to disruptions in 
foreign debt refinancing, to stricter roll-over terms and ultimately, to payment 
disruption. In order to impress the political cupola and to activate self-preserving 
instincts, the report makes explicit reference to Poland and Hungary whose debt 
problems – it was recalled – easily evolved quickly into political turmoil. A report to 
the Prime Minister from September 1987 labels the debt in convertible currencies as 
“snowballing”, while the Annual reports for 1988 and 1989 point out the increased 
risk premiums charged on Bulgarian loans by the creditors and the gradual exhaustion 
of fresh funding.
3 In the wake of the ethnic/political crisis during the Summer of 
1989
4, the BNB went one step further in assessing the situation. It recognised that 
Western banks’ attitude was a legitimate response to the “incapacity of the Bulgarian 
economy to adjust”, that there was no possibility of finding alternative sources of 
deficits financing and that the county was heading to insolvency (BNB, 18 July 1989).  
Warnings were issued, as well, about the consequences of the growing 
involvement with heavily indebted Third World countries. Exports to them (mainly 
armaments) were negotiated through Bulgarian government credits that were 
eventually never repaid. As early as 1987, the bank criticized the model which 
effectively consisted in the country importing from developed countries while 
exporting to insolvent developing nations (BNB, 2 September 1987). This politically 
motivated scheme led to a true external shock, commensurable to the magnitude of 
the energy shocks, or to losses of crucial export markets. 
On the whole, archival evidence attests to the fact that the central bank (and 
thus the country’s leadership) was well aware of the imminent default. At least three 
years before 29 March 1990, convincing indications were already evident about the 
inevitable and irreversible mid-term prospect. The fact that no public debate emerged 
in such circumstances is one of the essential peculiarities of the totalitarian system. 
                                                 
2 Annual reports were distributed to a handful of addressees. The documents, released in April, covered 
the previous year’s events. 
3 The somewhat delayed reaction of the markets could be partly explained by the presumption that 
Bulgaria, as usual, would be bailed out by the USSR. 
4 The crisis was triggered by the forced assimilation of the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria, which started in 
late 1984. In May 1989, an important part of the minority was de facto deported to Turkey. This 
produced a massive exodus with strong economic and political consequences. They contributed to the 
fall of the regime in November 1989.   13
Thanks to its position, the BNB was also the cashier, the accountant and the 
evaluator of domestic debt accumulation. Reports abound with critical notes on the 
para-fiscal credits extended to the enterprises. A “State Credit Fund”, in particular, 
was established in 1987 as a source for low return investments. The fund had to be 
replenished with money from the budget and from the habitual sources of deficit 
financing – the State saving bank (SSB) and the State insurance company. The goal 
was to cut off the newly created “commercial banks” from unprofitable credits, which 
in turn would be confined to the budget. The outcome was quite different, however. 
Government did not contribute its share to the fund, whilst resources were siphoned 
from the BNB and households (indirectly, through SSB) in order to finance 
megalomaniac investment projects, amassing bad debts and losses. Besides, a number 
of other channels added automatic credit. One of the most important, which was often 
pointed out by the BNB, was the loans extended by the Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank 
(BFTB) to exporters not repaid by their Third World customers. Thus, the growing 
and uncontrollable real public sector deficit extended far beyond the strictly defined 
budget account. 
Along side these “easy” criticisms, different topics (such as inflationary 
pressure) started to appear in the late 1980s. The more professional language of the 
BNB permitted it to bring up new issues completely forbidden in the public debate for 
decades. Nevertheless, even if the atmosphere had changed with the “perestroika” 
rhetoric, the BNB staff did not introduce inflation immediately into its agenda. 
Among the paradoxes of the communist regime is that the monetary authority was 
able to carry out its policy without ever mentioning the word: no more than a couple 
of documents using the term were found in the bank’s archives from early 1950s to 
mid 1980s. 
By the second half of the 1980s, it became impossible to ignore completely the 
phenomenon. Official prices were “adjusted” on several occasions, while everyday 
life provided numerous examples of rising prices in the ‘grey” markets. Three bank 
reports (of course strictly confidential, in only two copies) are particularly explicit in 
this respect (BNB Annual Report, 1987; BNB Annual Report, 1988; BNB, 7 January 
1988). They illustrate the technocratic “monetary thinking” during communism and 
uncover a clearly perceived institutional interest. The tacit view of the planning 
agencies that inflation is a simple discrepancy between overall incomes and supplied   14
consumer goods continue to be at the heart of the explanation. Novelties, however, are 
also introduced. It is recognized that under a system of administrated prices, inflation 
takes the form of deficits; attention is paid to the biased incentives’ structure; 
rigidities are pointed out. There is a clear effort to adopt a more “modern” discourse 
and to provide deeper insight. 
Actually, the most important “innovation” in this set of files is the direct 
connection of budget deficits with inflation accounting.
5 Due to the lack of a proper 
monetary analytical framework
6, monetization is not adequately articulated, and fiscal 
imbalances are presented essentially as a source of “hollow” revenues. Still, the BNB 
reports display an almost exhaustive list of instruments utilized by the State to drain 
funds from the economy and to invest them in priority targets, or simply in keeping 
ailing enterprises afloat. It is shown how producers were systematically decapitalized 
through a twisted price structure that benefited the budget; through disproportionate 
taxation (the average profit tax rate amounted to 75%); or via the overvalued 
exchange rate. Enterprises were eventually “compensated” with soft crediting that 
increased the debt burden, made any anti-inflationionary rise in interest rates 
politically unsustainable and built up huge amounts of bad debts. Negative real 
interests on deposits, in turn, penalized households’ voluntary savings and stimulated 
borrowing. The overall credits captured by the fiscal authorities from different 
segments of the monobank as well as from households and enterprises amounted to 
roughly 15% of national income.  
Cataloguing events is one thing but proposing a cure is quite another. There is 
no doubt that analyses contained in the BNB files from the late 1980s constituted a 
step forward compared to the traditional approach. When it came to masterminding 
consistent measures to be taken, however, the texts neatly reveal conceptual obstacles 
defined by political, ideological and professional barriers. The bank issued clear 
warning signals that bold stabilization policies were needed. At the same time, actual 
proposals were extremely limited in scope. The worth of archival documents is 
precisely in the evidence they provide about this double layer of communist economic 
thinking. 
                                                 
5 The only previous explicit mentions of this link were found in documents from 1956 and 1968. 
6 The term “monetization” is never employed. It is simply missing from the notional apparatus of the 
planning authorities’ monetary accounting where money creation is not traced at all.   15
 A first set of decisions was driven by panic. They could be labelled a “debt 
strategy” that consisted in contracting domestic debt and borrowing abroad with the 
sole purpose of keeping the economy running. Soft budget constraints on local 
enterprises are upheld and foreign debt is rolled over at ever increasing costs. There is 
nothing forward-looking in this policy: the only idea is to survive in the short-run. 
The BNB archives document the numerous new streams
7 of automatic loans 
and bad debts, as well as the series of debt rescheduling and/or forgiveness. As the 
beneficiaries were state-owned enterprises, the final source of this de facto public debt 
was the monobank. A general settlement of those debts came with the rescheduling 
agreement between the Ministry of finance and the BNB signed in March 1989. On 
paper, the maturity of the government’s budget liabilities towards the bank was 
prolonged to 50 years, starting in 1990, at 2.5% interest rate. This completely unusual 
formal recognition of non-compliance by the State was equivalent to its default on 
domestic debt. There was, of course, no announcement. It is curious to note that – 
symbolically enough – the act preceded by exactly one year the March 1990 default 
on Bulgarian foreign debt. These events reflected the failure of the two pillars of the 
instinctive, unimaginative “stabilization” policy followed since 1986. 
The BNB was the institution endorsed to implement this policy at the technical 
level. Although expressing dissent, the bank was not in a position to stop it. The only 
option was to produce more “sophisticated’ proposals, which however encountered 
obstacles of a different nature. 
Before anything else, the BNB’s influence was constrained by its institutional 
weight. Even if directly subordinated to the Executive, the monobank was involved in 
a classical conflict with the Ministry of Finance. As was the rule in those quarrels, 
fiscal considerations largely prevailed over monetary targets, thus maintaining the 
status quo in favour of the budget and the indebted enterprises. Personal rivalries also 
played a role. Several documents reveal that key decisions on foreign debt and reserve 
management were taken without the BNB’s approval, in an inner circle including 
political figures and BFTB high-level officials. This institutional setting restricted a 
priori the central bank’s influence and did not allow it to become (as would have been 
natural) the focal point of a comprehensive stabilization policy. 
                                                 
7 A great deal of them originated from the “commercial banks established ” in the course of 1987. They 
were owned by industrial enterprises and extended insider loans to their shareholders.   16
  The most “radical” proposals emanating from the BNB were in two 
directions. As already mentioned, at one level, they consisted of futile appeals to cut 
down inflationary deficit financing. The second axis was a plea for “correction” of the 
unrealistic exchange rate vis-à-vis convertible currencies and the elimination of the 
system of multiple rates. This model was one of the cornerstones of the communist 
economy: the overvalued exchange rate damped official figures of the foreign debt in 
Leva, exerted a deflationary pressure, accommodated enterprises’ cost inefficiencies 
and produced effortless fiscal revenues. At the same time, it was patently export-
penalizing and import-stimulating, thus contributing to balance of payments deficits 
and, eventually, to debt build-up. In fact, the exchange rate was adjusted on several 
occasions, but without challenging the basic principles. When the payment crisis 
matured during the late 1980s, the issue turned urgent and the BNB was, as would be 
expected, an advocate of devaluation. The evidence was accepted verbally by a 
fraction of the Party leadership, even the objective of Leva convertibility was 
launched publicly. However, there was obviously not enough political will to take the 
necessary decisions and the central bank remained isolated. 
Archives provide rich evidence about the discussion among insiders on the 
question of devaluation. In fact, the term was never employed even in confidential 
documents and the debate concerned the adjustment of the foreign exchange 
“coefficient”.
8 The BNB-promoted package for 1989 included a depreciation of the 
coefficient, the unification of the different rates and the use of the single rate in the 
balance sheets of the banks. The bank had previously launched the idea for limited 
currency auctions with the idea that a more realistic rate would emerge from the 
trading of export remittances.
9 Actually, the measures adopted were much delayed, 
fragmentized and inconsistent. An authentic foreign exchange market was only started 
in February 1991, as a key element of the IMF-sponsored stabilization program. 
                                                 
8 A complex system had developed historically. Differentiated coefficients served as a bridge between 
international and domestic commodity prices. Separate coefficients were used for financial transactions 
and cash exchange. Finally, the official rate served as accounting unit for foreign debt and balance of 
payment data. On 1 January 1988 the coefficient was raised from 1.5 to 2 Leva per 1 “foreign Leva” 
(the unit of accounting for external transactions), while the official rate remained unaffected. The BNB 
considered the move not enough and insisted on 2.20 Leva. Eventually the coefficient rose to 2.50 Leva 
(September 1989) and 3.00 Leva (proposed for January 1990) but the official rate was kept intact. 
9 Such auctions were organized sporadically, on a very limited scale, from 1988 onwards. On the first 
one  only 6.3 mn. USD were traded. In any event, the obtained exchange rate was much more realistic 
– an average of 7.9 Leva per USD (minimum of 2.52 Leva and maximum of 16 Leva), compared to the 
official rate of 2.0 Leva per USD.    17
The measures put forward by the BNB may seem “radical” in the prevailing 
context. In reality, they reflected ambiguous thinking and made the deeper conceptual 
barriers more apparent. Even the more “illuminated” technocrats of the regime were 
alienated by doctrinal dogmas and taboos, by a lack of the professional knowledge 
required to design a thorough stabilization agenda, by the missing adequate monetary 
data and national account framework. The accompanying steps documented by BNB 
files demonstrate that imagination did not manage to rise above the plan, the 
dominance of state ownership, the “socialist market” and regulated prices, the 
(slightly amended) monobank system and the bailing-out of enterprises. Convertible 
currency “self financing”
10 was not questioned. Convertibility of the Leva remained 
on the drawing table as a mid-term project (Project on Convertibility Law, 1989) 
including plenty of regulations, misunderstandings and palliatives. The BNB 
continued to rely on possible “improvements” of the planning procedures. Defence 
and security expenses continued to be treated as untouchable. 
One of the most constraining clichés was the incapacity to think about 
economic dynamics in cyclical terms. Communist ideology banned out of political 
correctness any reference to possible slowdowns. By coincidence, the Bulgarian 
regime had just adopted Gorbachev’s 1986 slogan about “economic acceleration”. In 
this context, the BNB (like all the other institutions) embraced a pro-growth rhetoric 
despite its awareness that the economy was highly import (and thus debt) elastic. 
Beside, the Party leadership feared instinctively bold economic measures that could 
provoke social and political unrest. “Preservation of the living standard” also 
remained top on the list of government priorities despite the fact that such policy was 
unsustainable. Correspondingly, the BNB’s attitude remained vague – it formulated 
the classical dilemma between rationing through prices or quantities/deficits, but at 
the same time, free prices were discarded as a policy response due to the “social cost” 
they entailed. In the technocrats’ imaginary “socialist” equilibrium, prices were still 
achievable. The same contradiction was apparent in the attitude vis-à-vis the 
debt/exchange rate quandary. The bank’s reports accept the unavoidable inflation 
generated by exchange rate adjustment as an acceptable way to curb soaring foreign 
debt, just to sustain that what is meant is “controlled price growth”. Moreover, during 
                                                 
10 The principle according to which imports can be made only to the amount of export proceedings. 
This technique was introduced during the Great Depression, but proved perfectly suitable to the 
autarchic communist economy deprived from a foreign exchange market.   18
the climax of the political crisis in the summer of 1989, the BNB did not refrain from 
panic reactions. Concerning subsidies, it acknowledges that the real sector is near to 
financial collapse, but the remedy was seen in terms of more “transparent” assistance 
and not in the complete termination of bailouts. Finally, even when the prospect of 
currency reform was mentioned for a while (BNB, 29 June 1989), the illusion 
remained that it would boil down to the previous “price adjustment” exercises and that 
incomes and savings would be preserved. 
Overall, the economic policy stance (even with the hypothetical inclusion of 
the bank’s amendments) was the opposite of that required given the state of 
macroeconomic fundamentals, namely restrictive monetary/fiscal measures and a 
reduction in aggregate demand. The authorities (including the BNB) were neither 
willing nor prepared ideologically or instrumentally to implement the needed 
“planned stagnation”. What is more, they had a completely schizophrenic view of the 
reform aim. The bank’s archives have preserved the termination of a contract with 
“Price Waterhouse” (BNB, 1 December 1989), which had been hired to consult the 
Bulgarian Government on “the elements of a market mechanism to be introduced in 
the planned economy”. The rationale behind the decision to interrupt the contract was 
that “the proposed economic-mathematical model is not suitable” for the purpose and 
that the American company requires data which “are strictly confidential or are not 
produced in the country.” Even on the very edge of the start of the transition to market 
economy, the authorities considered market reforms only as the next round (albeit on 
a larger scale) of planning engineering. The market itself was conceived not as a new 
social reality, but as a crotch to the plan in a hybrid economy still dominated by the 
State and the Party. 
 The outcome was a set of completely incoherent and devastating steps. A year 
was necessary after the fall of the regime in order to put in place a coalition 
Government, to bring the IMF in, and to design and articulate the bold January 1991 
stabilization package. Archival legacy demonstrate that the economic debacle of 
Bulgarian communism was not the result of information deficits – the authorities were 
well informed, often with a convenient lead. The roots are to be traced to the built-in 
biases and chiefly to intellectual deficits. Ruling elites were completely unprepared to 
design a lucid policy combining consistent goals and instruments. No doubt, this 
blindness reflected vested political interests, but it was mostly the sign of decades of   19
intellectual isolation which prevented decision-makers from conceptualizing the 
stabilization problem in an adequate common sense and theoretical framework. 
 
2.2 Yugoslavia: Trying a Ghosts Walk 
A “Plutarchian” parallel history could be written about Yugoslav stabilization 
during the 1980s. The main differences with the Bulgarian case are recognizable 
without difficulty. The regime in Belgrade was economically and politically more 
open to the West. Local ideological orthodoxy (self-management) was presented as 
the alternative to Soviet type planning implemented ritually in Bulgaria. The IMF had 
been present for years in the country, and this induced a much better structured public 
debate on stabilization issues. Yugoslavia displayed many institutional peculiarities 
with direct macroeconomic consequences, the most important being its federal 
governance. 
Yet, despite this clear distinctiveness, the Yugoslav case can be related in a 
very similar way to the Bulgarian one. It is also reducible to the conflict between 
stabilization imperatives and political expedience. The same clash of a politically 
sanctioned doctrine with economic realities is present. Identical mechanisms of 
bailouts, monetized budget deficits and unrestrained foreign debt building are 
triggered. 
Faced with severe balance of payments problems, in 1983 the Yugoslav 
Federal Government declared itself in default and entered a process of debt 
rescheduling (1983, 1984, 1986, 1987). After decades of large, uncontrolled use of 
external borrowing, the country was isolated from the international financial markets. 
IMF conditionality called for restrictive policies and for a liberalization of the foreign 
trade regime. Those measures, however, were implemented for a short period only. As 
early as 1985, the Federal Government and the National Bank of Yugoslavia (NBY) 
reversed the policy stance. Expansionary measures were adopted in order to avoid 
social troubles in an economy suffocated by a lack of external financing. Excessive 
money creation supported for a while the illusion that the socialist economic system 
was in a position to provide a way-out from the growing fiscal imbalances and to 
replenish enterprises’ losses. But this situation was clearly unsustainable, and in 1989   20
Yugoslavia was hit – for the first time in its history – by a classic hyperinflation. The 
main parameters of the crisis are summarized in Table 2 below. 
 
 
Table 2: SFRY 1980-1988 – Basic Indictors 
(Annual percentage change) 
 
            1980      1981    1982      1983  1984  1985  1986  1987   1988 
 
GDP        2.3 1.4 0.7 -1.0  -2.0  0.5 3.5 -1.1          -1.7 
Exports              32.2     39.2       11.8       -7.8        8.4       6.7     -17.9     -13.5    -11.3 
Money Supply 
Target               22.0     22.0        17.1      18.5  32.5    42.0      43.0       49.0     95.5 
Revised Target            26.0     28.0        16.5  15.5  42.7    36.9      82.0       89.4   115.0 
Outcome             23.1     26.6        26.6  20.1  43.1  46.5   109.1  99.8   223.0 
Retail Price Index        30        46  30  38  57  76      119  115    225 
Rates of Interest           5.5        6.4          7.5       10.2     13.4      15.3     68.2     42.0     89.3 
(Active)  
 
Source:  Dyker, 1990; SZS: SGJ, 1996; SZS: Index, 1989 
                   
Until 1989, the ruling elites in Yugoslavia did not consider radical political 
and economic reforms as a possible response to the unparalleled economic crisis faced 
by the country. The Federal Government and the NBY presented the state bankruptcy 
as an episode of “external debt consolidation” and an opportunity “for a breathing 
space to encourage export promotion to solve the balance of payments problems.” 
Successive devaluations of the national currency were the only answer to foreign 
exchange shortages. These palliative measures proved to be unsuccessful and 
counterproductive. Frequent changes of the exchange rate only aggravated the 
inflationary pressures in an economy, which was largely dependent on imports and 
suffering from enduring structural problems. 
The archives of the NBY from the 1980s speak for themselves about the 
negligence of the ruling elite. The system based on “social property” with no clear 
ownership and with regulations that favoured an ever-growing appetite for external 
borrowing continued to provoke biased reactions in decision makers. The files reveal 
that Yugoslav officials did not keep a record of the magnitude and structure of 
external debt. Within the country, no one knew the figures so that the Federal 
Government had to pay foreign banks to perform the calculations. In early 1983 one 
member of the negotiating team revealed that “we still today do not have exact data   21
concerning our foreign obligations” and there had been “various disputes between 
Central Committee members about some earlier unregistered loans…Where these 
unpaid obligations are hiding we learned from our foreign partners instead” (Burg, 
1986). 
The public was informed only on the authorities’ awareness of the need for 
debt rescheduling and this was presented as their own idea and initiative. The only 
message they were willing to convey was that the Government was following an 
independent economic policy: an obviously untenable assertion in the midst of severe 
economic and financial turmoil at the international level and of the urgent necessity 
for a radical, IMF-supported stabilization program at home.  
Faced with chronic of payments problems, the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRY) cooperated intensively with the IMF.
11 In the pre-reform period, 
the country had negotiated 11 Stand-by Arrangements (SBA).
12 The first five of them 
(of a total of 289.5 mn. SDR) were concluded between 1961 and 1971, at a time when 
the monetary authorities could still control inflation.
13 The following six SBA 
(totalling 3046.6 mn. SDR) were implemented from 1979 to 1988, when severe 
external imbalances, along with high inflation that grew finally into hyperinflation, 
characterised the economy. 
Since 1979, all pre-reform stabilization programs accompanying SBA failed. 
While the international financial community was able to “help” SFRY dampen 
deficits (it became quite risky to lend money for imports to an over-indebted country), 
curbing inflation depended on Yugoslav authorities alone. The IMF representatives 
urged the implementation of a restrictive monetary policy that would result in positive 
real interest rates and a realistic exchange rate for the Dinar; a fiscal squeeze in order 
to reduce the rate of growth of public expenditure; the lifting of administrative price 
controls and correction of energy price disparities. None of these stabilization goals 
was reached. The deficit on current account was cut only in 1982 and 1983 due to a 
sharp fall in imports. The result was a net capital outflow from Yugoslavia to Western 
                                                 
11 Yugoslavia was one of the founders of Bretton-Woods institutions in 1944.  
12 The 12
th SBA was negotiated with the IMF in 1990, in line with radical changes to the Yugoslav 
political and economic system. That was the last SBA that the IMF granted to SFRY before state 
dissolution. 
13 The IMF introduced the credit technique of Stand-by Arrangements in 1952. Yugoslavia did not use 
this financial facility based on conditionality until 1961 (Stojanovic, 1991).   22
countries.
14 Inflation persisted, real interest rates remained negative, Dinar 
devaluations hardly kept pace with inflation, pubic expenditure grew, administrative 
price controls and distortions remained and external financing was inaccessible. After 
a decade of intensive albeit unfruitful cooperation with the IMF, in 1988, the IBRD 
classified SFRY among those countries that “did not want, or could not help 
themselves” (Jovovic, 1988). 
  Why did all the IMF-sponsored programs in Yugoslavia during the 1980s fail? 
It would be unreasonable to think that Federal authorities “did not want” to cope with 
the problems. A more rational hypothesis is that officials negotiated conditions they 
were not capable of complying with, or did not have instruments to implement. The 
domestic institutional background of those SBA was the so-called “agreement 
economy”, introduced in full in the early 1970s. This unique model (self-management 
agreements, self-managed interest associations, organizations of associated labour) 
planted in the old economic system was characterized by decentralised decision 
making that granted federal units and local bureaucrats unrestricted right to obtain 
money for investments or consumption whenever they found it necessary.     
  The 1979 SBA was contracted when Yugoslav current account deficit reached 
its post-WW II peak of 3.7 billion USD and annual inflation (measured by the retail 
price index) stood at 22%. The gap was financed mainly through expensive foreign 
financial loans extended by multinational private banks. That was the outcome of 
changes in the 1970s legislation, which simplified and broadened credit relations with 
the international financial community. Borrowing abroad became accessible not only 
to the Federal Government and federal units but to banks and self-managed firms. 
Any legal entity could obtain foreign loans and use them for any purpose, including 
its conversion into Dinars to cover current expenditure. Such prodigality led to a 
situation in which Yugoslavia’s total foreign debt grew from 3.4 billion USD (1972) 
to 20.6 billion USD (1981) in just a decade (Gnjatovic, 1985). The borrowing 
structure changed drastically in favour of funds that were more expensive from 
private banks (these amounted to 79.9% of total foreign debt in 1982 compared to 
43.9% in 1970). Simultaneously, debt repayment became more risky, the share of 
unwarranted debt rising from 26.4% in 1970 to 65.1% in 1982.  
                                                 
14 Between 1983 and 1990, the net outflow of capital from SFRY amounted to 20.5 billion USD 
(Gnjatovic, 1995). In this respect, Yugoslavia was similar to the debt ridden Third World countries 
during the 1980s. The successive treatments of their crises were the “Baker plan” and “Brady deals”.     23
As long as the 1979 SBA was within the limits of the first credit trench, the 
degree of conditionality remained relatively low. Yugoslav authorities issued a 
document claiming that they were going to make “reasonable endeavours” to 
overcome the balance of payments problems. In June 1980, the IMF approved the 
second and third trench of an 18-month SBA, this time with tougher conditionality. 
During its implementation, at the beginning of 1981, the Polish default occurred and 
credit flows from private multinational banks to socialist countries started to dry up. 
The banks needed warrantees that SFRY was still a solvable debtor, so that the IMF 
granted Yugoslavia a three-year credit of 1.6 billion SDR (2.2 million USD), now 
within the fourth, highly conditional credit trench (Stojanovic, 1991). This was the 
largest IMF loan ever and it represented a milestone in Yugoslavia’s relations with the 
international financial community (Dyker, 1990). In return, the Fund imposed tough 
constraints on the authorities, which adopted the Economic Development Plan 1981-
1985 providing the basis for the 1981 stabilization program.
15  
Very soon, however, the situation deteriorated. By late 1982, large Yugoslav 
firms had accumulated huge financial losses and were unable to repay their 
outstanding external obligations. With depleted foreign exchange reserves, the Federal 
Government could do nothing but declare default, asking foreign creditors to 
reschedule the debt. Like many Latin American countries, the authorities were obliged 
to take charge of all external liabilities regardless of their issuer and its reimbursement 
capacity. 
The default deprived the Yugoslav economy from fresh foreign financing. The 
only way to inject money was by creating it at home. By the end of 1983, the inflation 
rate (measured by retail price index) reached 30%. The Federal authorities were called 
upon to control money supply and to maintain the Dinar exchange rate as realistic as 
possible. However, deprived from their discretionary functions, they found it 
increasingly difficult: “the history of post-1983 exchange rate policy has, then, been 
the history of a desperate race by the authorities to keep the rate of devaluation ahead 
of the rate of inflation” (Dyker, 1990).  
                                                 
15 The main elements of this Program were: structural adjustment of the economy to redirect 
investments in agriculture and domestic energy sources and to strengthen exports; reduction of 
domestic demand with help of restrictive monetary policy; reduction of the current account deficit; the 
pursuit of realistic exchange rate policy (Jovovic, 1981).   24
Creditors conditioned the rescheduling negotiations on the adoption of new 
stabilization measures approved by the IMF. The Fund required explicitly from the 
authorities to compel banks to set a realistic capital price through positive real interest 
rates. When the Government committed itself to comply, the IMF unlocked the last 
tranche of the 1981 SBA. That was a “green light” for debt rescheduling. The final 
deal involved 15 countries and 583 creditor banks, signed in April 1983 (Gnjatovic, 
1987). 
The July 1983 Anti-Inflationary Program (part of the Long Term Economic 
Stabilization Program) stipulated that it was “abnormal to have nominal interests 
which are not related to the inflation rate … and that it is essential to discontinue the 
policy of negative real interest rates” (Antiinflacioni program, 1983). During the talks 
with the IMF, Government and NBY representatives insisted on a gradual shift to 
positive rates, not before April 1985. As claimed, a rapid pace would ruin the already 
over-indebted economy and trigger a new inflationary spiral due to the transfer of 
interest costs into prices. Initially, the Fund’s position was that transition should be 
completed in 1984 (Hofmann, 2004), but in April 1984 it accepted the gradual 
schedule and granted a one-year credit within a new SBA. Even with a rescheduled 
external debt, the country was short of hard currency to meet the 1984 interest 
payments and foreign creditors agreed to extend a refinancing loan. 
The 1984-1985 rescue operation failed: in April 1985, real interest rates 
remained negative and annual inflation reached 70%. With the May 1985 SBA the 
IMF continued to insist on positive interest rates. The target of 1% in real terms was 
set as the boldest measure against inflation approaching 100%. The Yugoslav 
economy had been trapped into the vicious circle of foreign debt refinancing, 
recession and an inflationary spiral. IMF Enhanced Surveillance accompanied another 
refinancing effort from 1986 to 1988, but exports and GDP were already falling.  
In the last pre-reform SBA (1988) conditionality included freeing prices on the 
majority of products, free imports, monthly indexation of interest rates and a floating 
of the Dinar. Foreign private creditors considered this SBA as “better than all granted 
before” (IMF Survey, 1990). However, the targets were not met and the economic 
situation continued to deteriorate. By December 1989, the threshold of a classical 
hyperinflation was traversed: price rose by 59% on a monthly and by 1200% on a 
yearly basis (NBY Annual Report, 1990).   25
3. Alternative Views  
Were there alternatives to Government stabilization policies in the late 1980s? 
The cases discussed above point out that different options had been discussed among 
both countries’ decision-makers. In Bulgaria, to certain extent, the “innovative centre” 
was the BNB. As mentioned, the novelty and radicalism of its advice and the 
influence of the bank were severely limited. In Yugoslavia, in turn, the natural 
opponent of the Government was the IMF whose dissenting position was overtly 
expressed. The shaping of stabilization policies occurred during the continuous 
exchange of arguments that accompanied stand-by arrangements. 
The question remains whether there were deeper insights into the origin of the 
macroeconomic troubles. By default, they could be produced only by experts and 
academia. What is interesting here is not the disclosure of institutional archives, but 
rather the publicly presented critical approaches that prepared the ground for future 
policy choices. 
 
3.1 Bulgaria: Turning Neoclassical 
The orthodox communist regime in Bulgaria did not leave much space for 
critical public discussions of economic issues. Nonetheless, opinions have never been 
completely uniform and increasing divergences could not be concealed. Society grew 
in complexity with corresponding nuances of opinion emerging, different groups in 
the Party’s elite were looking for alternative paths in the obviously needed reforms 
and the professional community became more vocal. Until the early 1980s, the 
economics profession in Bulgaria was characterized by a dominance of “soviet style” 
thinking and by an almost complete isolation from contact with mainstream 
economists (Avramov, 2004). The climate began to change slowly with the onset of 
the Soviet “perestroika” and the concomitant development of a truly critical stance. 
Without taking dissident political positions, a few scholars started to question 
fundamentals of the policy choices. The breakthrough came with a small group of (a 
new generation) economists that got progressively acquainted with mainstream 
economics, took a pronounced positivist approach, distanced itself from ideological 
topics and language, developed an interest in the work of more “Westernized” Polish,   26
Hungarian and Czech scholars, and were charmed by the rediscovered works of 
Soviet economist from the 1920s. 
The first issue was dogmatization of the “inherent to socialism” high growth 
rates. Although delayed by the specific price mechanism in COMECON economies, 
the effects of the first oil shock were palpable and – in analytical terms – growth 
acceleration was no more an obvious choice. Quantitative studies proved the strong 
import elasticity of the Bulgarian economy and thus the negative balance of payment 
impacts of a fast track. (Kostov and Hristov, 1981; Antonov, 1986; Kostov, 1989) 
Import dependence was not unknown to Government technocrats, but its corollary 
was ideologically unacceptable. Indeed, “critical economists” went a step further by 
advocating adjustment through a cooling down of the economy and formulating 
explicitly the “subversive” argument of the innate cyclical nature of communist 
growth (Antonov, 1987; Antonov 1989a; Antonov, 1989b; Avramov, 1989; Avramov, 
1990). What is more, they rejected the dogma that maximazing the rate of growth is 
equivalent to maximizing welfare: it was shown that in a general equilibrium 
framework the assertion is true only under unrealistically tight presumptions 
(Antonov, 1988). The root of this ideologically untouchable “equivalence theorem” – 
it was shown – lay in early industrialization stereotypes: if transposed into a more 
advanced economy they lead to intolerable disequilibria.  
A clear divide between “informed” elites and “critical economists” appeared in 
the approach to inflation as well. At about the same moment when the BNB (one of 
the ‘informed’ elite) was elaborating a more “neutral” vision, the issue was presented 
by the latter in a neoclassical framework. The consequences were an analysis that 
went far beyond technicalities and evidences, to demonstrate the intrinsic link 
between inflation and the adopted economic policy. In the age of “reformed” 
communism, prices became a regulator and producers were increasingly motivated by 
nominal parameters.
16 If the regime, in such a situation, is not able to exert full control 
over revenues (which has always been the case) inflation is unavoidable and 
economic policy – despite doctrinal incompatibilities – has no choice but to 
accommodate it. By the end of the decade, V. Antonov proposed a full-fledged model 
of communist inflation based on neoclassical principles (Antonov, 1989b; Antonov, 
                                                 
16 This point has been observed in the overview of the “archival revolution”. (Gregory and Harrison, 
2005, p. 746).   27
1990). The core of its diagnosis was that prevailing imbalances were related to the 
departure of marginal factor prices from factor productivity, and to the absence of an 
equilibrium price
17 of capital. The model outlined mechanisms, linked them to the 
conceptual codes of official economic policy, and produced computable estimates of 
the inflationary potential in the Bulgarian economy.    
The emergence of a coherent alternative to the Government’s eclectic and 
inconclusive views had important implications for stabilization policies. The very 
possibility of reforming the economy in a planned framework was discarded. The 
history of the previous experiments added to the ongoing evidence that the intents to 
combine the plan with a degree of decentralization was only increasing the system’s 
entropy. The communist economy functions properly merely in its rigid original 
skeleton: every reform program had made it less manageable and had given birth to an 
archipelago of “grey markets”. This conclusion was completely in line with the 
detailed ex-post review of the archives, asserting that “the result of partial reforms 
were if anything worse than those of the unreformed system” (Gregory and Harrison, 
2005, p. 755). And with the insight in Janos Kornai’s memoirs that “any loosening of 
the planning system could, as happened after Stalin’s death, undermine it…the 
Socialist system worked less and less well as repression was lifted, because it had no 
substitutes for ideology and terror” (Skidelsky, 2007, p. 52, 53). 
Criticism based on general equilibrium assumptions and empirical research not 
only exhibited the incompatibility between a planed economy and genuine market-
oriented reforms, but also made it obvious that official policies produce profound 
imbalances, recurrent cycles and structural balance-of-payment deficits. Even if the 
diagnosis of communist technocrats and of “critical economists” could overlap in 
regard to certain symptoms, the cure differed in a fundamental way. For the first 
group it consisted in injecting (often-truncated) fragments of monetary stimuli, while 
for the second the way out was a bold monetization of the entire economy. The 
stabilization corollary of the latter option was (although not yet plainly specified) the 
forthcoming shock therapy with the corresponding termination of automatic credits, of 
traditional budget deficit financing and of the habitual expedient of cumulating 
foreign debt. In the “reformed” communist economy, “money mattered” in isolated 
pockets and in a biased unsystematic manner. The goal was to make money matter 
                                                 
17 In fact – the negative discount rate.   28
consistently. The empirical work performed highlighted the scale of repressed 
inflation in the Bulgarian economy by the end of the 1980s and consequently revealed 
the magnitude of the stabilization shock that would be produced by price 
liberalization. 
Looking with hindsight on the ambiance of the regime’s final years, it should 
be emphasised that the voice of the handful of radical proponents of full-fledged 
monetization remained isolated and that even among them a vagueness about the 
stabilization policies needed was common. Their strong critical impetus confronted 
conceptual barriers of different kind. A sense of the “immortality” of the system was 
widespread despite the evident signs of its decomposition. With yet no clear political 
alternatives in sight, the invectives were addressed at the authorities, as if they were 
capable to take rational decisions and/or to correct inadequate choices. Until 1987-
1988, it was mainly the structural disequilibria that characterised the Bulgarian 
economy that were stressed, and only during the closing two or three years that the 
focus shifted to inflation issues and the financial and central bank aspects of 
stabilization. 
An understanding the pace of the transformation was also relatively slow in 
coming. The logic of the elimination of the monetary overhang by the lifting of price 
controls made a “shock perspective” unavoidable. Illusions about possible soft 
solutions, however, persisted even among “critical economists”. It is only when the 
old regime was overthrown that the dichotomy of “gradualism versus shock therapy” 
emerged as a political fault line. The gradualist position expressed the mix of 
professional incompetence, traditional communist reformism and efforts to save time 
in order to prepare better the expected capture of key economic positions. The 
alternative view summarized the radical reform agenda by packing measures that – in 
reality – were to be unevenly implemented (partly by those same critics) during the 
next several years. 
Nowadays, most of the claims against the communist economic system and the 
Party’s policies during the late 1980s might seem trivial. After all, the debate on the 
feasibility of central planning had lasted for nearly a century, with convincing 
negative arguments put forward as early as the 1930s Lange-von Mises controversy. It 
was substantially enriched in the following decades, and – above all – was confirmed 
by the cascading failures of the communist experiment itself. However, this ex-post   29
statement does not account for the very different stock of mainstream economic 
knowledge among countries. The fact that some Bulgarian economists started to 
question the basics from a neoclassical perspective only few years before the collapse 
of the regime reflects, inter alia, the long intellectual isolation of the scholarly 
milieu.
18 Under communism, the most difficult thing was to state the obvious. 
Criticisms articulated in such an enclosed space became remarkable events, and in a 
sense, they really were because of the painstaking efforts required to produce what 
was considered elsewhere as “standard’ knowledge and of the social nonconformist 
attitudes needed to articulate it. Their real weight was distorted threefold: more often 
than not, they were overstated; seclusion prevented even the scarce genuine 
contributions from finding their rightful place in the mainstream debate; there was no 
adequate local milieu to absorb the messages. In an open society, the input of those 
economists would have integrated adequately the flow of “universal knowledge”.  
Thus, a legacy of a higher intellectual permeability vis-à-vis the West is 
expected to have facilitated the formulation of a sensible stabilization policy. This 
was, indeed, the case for Hungary and Poland, where the design of the transition 
programs was not such a dramatic conceptual challenge as in Bulgaria. The Yugoslav 
experience, however, qualifies this assertion. 
 
3.2 Yugoslavia: Criticizing “Federalist monetary policy”  
After WWII Yugoslav economists built a reputation of original judgment with 
the elaboration of the self-management model, which exerted a visible influence 
among quite diverse audiences worldwide. The political connotation of the idea has 
always been strong and − not surprisingly − the model developed into an ideological 
creed with its own academic establishment.
19  
When the mid-1980s economic crisis struck the country, two main currents 
prevailed among the profession. The first was led by the protagonists of the self-
management system who were reluctant to admit that at the end of the day their 
                                                 
18 The isolation refers not so much to inaccessibility of books and journals (they were actually 
accessible), but to the lack of a vivid intellectual exchange with Western counterparts, and/or to the 
almost nonexistent examples of socialization abroad (Avramov, 2004). 
19 Yugoslav scholars of international renown have made important contributions to macroeconomic 
issues as well, and in particular to the business cycle theory in a “socialist” context (for example A. 
Bajt).   30
invention proved to be quite ineffective. The second urged for a stabilization program, 
but carried out within the existing political and economic model. Nevertheless, the 
latter were the first to perform a realistic analysis of the current outlook for the 
Yugoslav economy and to explain the causes of its poor performance. They were 
criticized both by the adepts of the self-management system and by the ruling elite. 
The critiques persisted until the very moment of the implementation of the December 
1989 stabilization program, accompanied by a set of reformist legislation.        
A focal point in the debate over stabilization policies was the role of the NBY. 
The split opinions on this issue reflected diverging attitudes towards the fundamentals 
of the reform agenda. 
In the wake of the last pre-reform SBA (June 1988), the IMF representatives 
argued that negative economic trends were the consequence ‘of an easy going 
behaviour of Yugoslavia’ (Jovovic, 1987). They pointed out that much of the blame 
lay with the Central bank, which tried to keep social peace by accommodating 
subsidies to priority economic sectors and by covering the financial losses of firms. 
Experts missed out, however, that the NBY was not in a legal position to oppose 
subsidies and bailing out. Yet, it was clear that such policy would affect negatively 
the economy that was already in deep crisis.  
In 1990, the IMF recognized for the first time that during the 1980s the Central 
bank of SFRY has been left without almost no monetary authority and control over 
the commercial banks (IMF Survey, 1990). Until then, neither the Yugoslav political 
elite, nor the IMF missions had ever questioned the awkward Yugoslav monetary 
system as one of the causes for the successive stabilization programs failures. They 
ignored the writings of those Yugoslav economists who stressed that, as a completely 
dependent institution, the NBY did not have legal power to cope with inflation 
(Djurić, 1974; Golijanin, 1974; Golijanin 1987; Gaspari, 1988; Kastratović, 1988; 
Jovic, 1990). Attention was not paid, too, to “critical economists’” emphasis on the 
negative effects of monetary policy decentralization on macro-economic stability. 
They did avoid comparative methods simply because the SFRY central banking 
experience was unique (Golijanin, 1987). Yet, their analyses clearly revealed that the 
NBY fiasco in the 1980s could be attributed to the so-called Federal central banking 
system. This view – considered as a truism in the 1990s – was shaped during the 
previous decades.   31
A unified Central bank existed in socialist Yugoslavia only until the beginning 
of the 1970s. The 1971 constitutional amendments and the eventual new Constitution 
of 1974 gave to the branches of NBY in the federal entities’ capitals (later in the 
autonomous provinces as well) the prerogatives of central banking institutions within 
a Federal central banking system (Djuric, 1974).
20 Those changes were inspired by the 
overall political and economic reforms, which initiated the rupture of the common 
economic space of socialist Yugoslavia.
21  
The new setting affected relations between the central bank and commercial 
banks directly. The NBY was deprived largely of its regulatory functions, while 
national banks of federal units and autonomous provinces were in a position to 
refinance credit institutions operating on their territory. Thus, the so-called territorial 
principle became the basic organizational rule (Golijanin, 1974). Another important 
feature was that enterprises were the stakeholders of the established commercial 
banks, but had only one vote regardless of their share in the capital. Bank directors 
were appointed by the local Communist Party leaders and in the early 1980s the key 
decision makers were mainly the managers from those business firms that had 
accumulated substantial losses (Gaspari, 1988). 
The Federal central banking system was led by a Council of Governors taking 
its resolutions on the grounds of consensus. Thus, the “negotiation economy” which 
contradicted market principles was introduced into the very heart of the Yugoslav 
monetary model (Jovic, 1990). As each Governor defended the interests of his own 
territorial unit, and not those of general monetary stability, the Council de facto aimed 
at harmonizing attitudes in a markedly polycentric economy and bureaucracy. Given 
this very difficult task, the NBY Governor had extremely limited cohesive power. 
Moreover, the Council did not decide sovereignty on monetary policy targets and 
discretionary measures. It only recommended them to the Federal Parliament and to 
the Federal Government who took final decisions. Only then, did the NBY choose the 
appropriate monetary policy tools. 
                                                 
20 The Federal central banking system institutions were: National Bank of Yugoslavia, National Bank 
of Slovenia, National Bank of Croatia, National Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina, National Bank of 
Macedonia, National Bank of Montenegro, National Bank of Serbia, National Bank of Vojvodina and 
National Bank of Kosovo.    
21 Western experts based their analyses on the political and economic changes in SFRY during the 
1970s on the writings of the above-mentioned Yugoslav economists. See, for example: Dyker (1990) 
and Koyama (2003).    32
Critics of the system had pointed out that Yugoslav firms tried (successfully) 
to create their own parallel money in all possible ways by exploiting the advantage of 
a situation in which the monetary authorities were not in a position to control money 
supply (Kastratovic, 1988). Enterprises could delay payments of financial obligations 
towards their suppliers and banks, and/or issue unsecured bills of exchange. Such 
financial indiscipline had the same effects on inflation and consumption as an 
unrestrained money supply expansion by the Central bank. As the monetary 
authorities were not able to manage such irregular monetary flows, commercial banks 
were reluctant to make a move. 
Furthermore, “critical economists” outlined how unprofitable firms survived 
mainly on bank credits. Borrowings were rarely invested: the decade was 
characterized by a fall in investment activity and by the simultaneous growth of 
indebtedness. The real sector was permanently in a position of net debtor. The firms’ 
share in banking deposits dropped (from 54% in 1971 to 21% in 1988) while the share 
of banking credits to business grew (from 75% to 92% during the same period) 
(Gnjatovic, 1989). Thus, banks became directly dependent on the real sector’s 
declining capacity to service its massively increasing obligations. 
Faced with insolvent firms, the banks had two options: to stay formally alive 
by tolerating the financial indiscipline of their clients or to close by declaring 
bankruptcy. The inflationary option of a generalized bailout was chosen, at least for a 
short time. In late 1988, the NBY abandoned further intentions to implement a 
restrictive monetary policy and cancelled credit limits for commercial banks. The 
accommodating monetary stance was maintained in 1989. 
The shortcomings of the system formulated by its critics had to be 
acknowledged publicly. For the first time, in the last pre-reform SBA (1988) 
economic liberalization was explicitly identified as the only therapy from harsh 
inflation. The ultimate SBA with the IMF (March 1990) was negotiated on the basis 
of a new stabilization program overtly foreseeing radical changes and a transition to a 
market economy. Within months, the core for the Yugoslav model was officially 
proclaimed as finished: IMF experts declared that the dismantling of “social property” 
is “crucial for the progress in economic reforms” (Stojanovic, 1991).           
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4. Concluding Remarks 
Within slightly different periods Bulgaria (1985-1991) and Yugoslavia (1983-
1989) experienced severe debt and inflationary crises. They triggered the crash of two 
different – but in many aspects alike – socialist economic systems (central planning 
and self-management) suffering from intrinsic inefficiencies. It is no wonder that 
stabilization policies implemented by the regimes in place proved also to be in vain. 
The ruling elites remained encapsulated in the confidence that the economy could be 
stabilized within the existing political and economic framework. “Critical 
economists”, for their part, came much closer to the roots of the problems and to their 
macroeconomic features, without being able, however, to design a fully consistent 
stabilization package before the collapse of the regimes themselves. 
In Bulgaria, the lack of coherence reflected to a great extent scarcity of 
mainstream economic knowledge among ruling elites and the bulk of the professional 
community, which were unable to overcome old-fashioned dogmas. Those economists 
who better mastered Western theory and had a deeper understanding of market 
economies formulated the most insightful assessments. The Yugoslav case was more 
ambiguous, involving a wider variety of players – followers of an indigenous school 
(self-management) prized even by some Western economists; political decision-
makers managing the short-term stabilization policies; a few economists closer to 
mainstream economics; the IMF (absent from pre-communist Bulgaria) with its 
conditionality. This greater openness led to the short-lived implementation of 
conventional orthodox measures, rapidly reversed, however, by a destabilizing “Third 
World-style” devaluation spiral and by pro-inflationary policies.  
Eventually, coherence came from abroad and/or from the aftermaths of 
political debacle. In Bulgaria, the early 1990s stabilization program based on the 
Washington consensus was masterminded only after the fall of the “old guard” 
communist regime in 1989 and when the country joined the IMF in 1990. The results 
remained unconvincing for some years due not so much to conceptual shortcomings, 
but to the slow pace of monetization of the economy and to the untenable coexistence 
of still dominant state ownership (protracted privatization) with liberalized economic 
behaviour. In Yugoslavia, the drama of the Federation’s dissolution was needed in 
order to change fundamentally economic perceptions, at least in the independent 
successor states that emerged to the West. There the ruling elites and the economic   34
profession reached consensus on the imperative for a quick economic transition. By 
contrast, Serbian reform-oriented economists remained isolated from the authorities. 
The international economic sanctions were to become one of the causes, but also the 
excuse, for sluggish reforms and for the further deepening of economic crisis in this 
country.      
An essential lesson drawn from both cases is that closer contacts with the West 
(and with mainstream economic thinking) were a necessary, but not sufficient, 
condition to impose a more coherent stabilization package. While the old regimes 
(Yugoslavia 1983-1989; Bulgaria 1985-1989) and the strong relics of the communist 
economic system (Bulgaria 1990-1997) were still in place, political considerations 
prevailed over economic logic, thus preventing authentic reforms and bold action. 
Even institutional conditionality was not able to reverse this trend. The neat “with-
without IMF” test suggests that when imposed on an intact political, economic and 
decision-taking status-quo conditionality produces only marginally better results. In 
1987-1990, Bulgaria was confronted with the conditionality of the markets and 
nevertheless ended up with soaring foreign debt and huge inflationary potential. 
During 1983-1989, Yugoslavia faced the robustly structured IMF machine only to win 
a short-lived easing: the aftermath was a hyperinflationary crisis prompted by an 
unmoved economic power structure that continued to generate uncontrolled money 
creation. 
The “parallel histories” of both countries confirms once more that there is no 
credible economic stabilization without trustworthy political change. These two 
processes ultimately converged with the introduction of the Currency Board in 
Bulgaria (1997) and with the emergence of stable political entities out of the former 
Yugoslav republics. The laborious adjustment was an intellectual challenge as well. 
Elites in communist countries were unevenly prepared to implement stabilization 
policies. But there is no doubt that they were overwhelmingly unprepared to imagine 
and to conceptualize the actual economic, social and political upheaval that was to be 
generated by the transition from overriding state (“social”) ownership to private 
property. 
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